So far, attention has focused on whether Japan would get its first female prime minister or its youngest, along with the many domestic challenges that await the eventual winner.
Less discussed, but at least as important, are the ramifications of the LDP leadership election for Japan’s foreign policy.
The stakes are high given Japan’s fraught external environment coinciding with an LDP battered at the polls. Will either candidate be able to save a party struggling to provide fresh vision?
From what is known about Ms Takaichi and Mr Koizumi, it appears that they offer Japan different future pathways in a daunting geopolitical landscape.
Dangers without
The threats from Japan’s neighbourhood are rising. China is building up its armed forces with designs on what Tokyo considers to be Japanese territory while apparently preparing for a military conquest of Taiwan. North Korea, which has threatened to use nuclear arms against Japan, controls a growing arsenal of such weapons. Russia, which in Japan’s view already illegally occupies the Northern Territories, is embroiled in a merciless invasion of Ukraine, which deeply alarms Tokyo. It does not help that China and Russia are forging closer ties.
In the face of these worrying trends, what Japan is getting from its US ally is, at best, tough love. The Trump administration is pressing Tokyo to sharply increase its defence spending and pay more to cover the costs of American bases in Japan. It’s a tall order, not least because of Japan’s high public debt.
To make matters worse, Washington is also charging a 15 per cent tariff on all imports from Japan, with the threat of a higher rate if Japan does not invest US$550 billion (S$709 billion) in the US before the end of the Trump presidency. The Japanese government accepts these onerous terms because it is still deeply committed to maintaining the Tokyo-Washington alliance, even though Japanese doubts about US reliability are higher than ever.
Weakness within
Japan’s ability to cope with these external challenges starts with political unity at home. In the 70 years since it was founded, the LDP has controlled Japan’s government for all but four years. Its dominance, however, is declining. During Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s less than a year in the job, his party lost seats in both houses of the Diet in separate elections. For the first time since 1955, the LDP does not hold a majority in either the Upper or Lower House. Its coalition partner, Komeito, is also bleeding support.
Rising living costs are a major reason for the changes in party fortunes. The opposition Democratic Party for the People, for instance, is rising in popularity on the strength of its simple message – “Increase your take-home pay”.
At the same time, the Maga-like Sanseito party is drawing away traditional LDP conservative voters. The number of foreigners in Japan has risen rapidly since 2021 because of the need for workers and an increase in tourism. Sanseito calls for stricter immigration policies, greater efforts to identify and deport foreigners who commit crimes and cutting off foreigners from welfare benefits. In the July 2025 Upper House election, Sanseito jumped from holding just one seat to 14.
A diminished LDP can no longer push legislation through the Diet unhindered, including on matters of foreign policy.
After the LDP, the next largest voting bloc in the Diet is the coalition comprising the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP).
While the LDP wants a balanced approach towards the Middle East, the CDP demands that Japan recognise Palestine as an independent state. Responding to public complaints over crime involving foreigners, the LDP supports tougher screening of immigrants and a crackdown on illegal residents. But the CDP-SDP coalition blocked implementation of these changes, saying they reflect prejudice and are inconsistent with Japan’s human rights commitments.
The CDP and SDP oppose Japan acquiring missiles that could strike enemy territory. They also resist deepening security cooperation with the US.
As the opposition grows in strength, the LDP cannot count on support from its pacifist coalition partner.
Komeito opposes anything nuclear, whether weapons or energy. Last year it blunted the LDP’s push for restoring Japan’s dependence on nuclear power plants. The LDP had to block Komeito from sending representatives to a UN anti-nuclear weapons conference in New York earlier this year, citing Japan’s reliance on the US nuclear umbrella.
Komeito is also against plans to raise defence spending and has attempted to prevent the government from loosening restrictions on Japan exporting weapons, which the LDP wants to do in order to strengthen its relationship with the US and to assist Ukraine.
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The two front-runners
The LDP sees two strategies for improving its fortunes. One is appealing to younger Japanese, whose main demands are lower taxes and relief from high prices. The other is to win back the conservative nationalists who have switched their loyalty to Sanseito. Mr Koizumi represents the first strategy, Ms Takaichi the second.
Both support Japan’s alliance with the US and have positive views of trilateral security cooperation between Japan, the US and South Korea. Ms Takaichi, however, would be more likely to disrupt Japan’s foreign relations if she became prime minister.
Ms Takaichi, 64, is a hardline conservative who favours revising Japan’s pacifist Constitution and has visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine repeatedly. She advocates strengthening Japan’s defences, increased integration of US and Japanese forces, and deployment of US intermediate-range missiles on Japanese territory to protect Japan from China. She is a strong backer of Taiwan, even suggesting that Japan, India, Europe, Australia and Taiwan should form a collective security alliance.
Ms Takaichi has a revisionist view of Japan’s behaviour during World War II. She has, for example, questioned the 1993 Kono Statement (which admitted Japanese military complicity in the wartime “comfort women” sex slavery operation) and the 1995 Murayama Statement (which apologised for Japanese aggression during the war).
She believes Japan’s education system should promote patriotism. For Japanese women, the excitement of potentially seeing the country’s first female prime minister is tempered by Ms Takaichi’s conservative family values, which many consider outdated.
Although a defence hawk, Ms Takaichi is a dove on economic policy, advocating tax cuts, cash payments to households, and issuing bonds to finance measures to reduce living costs.
Nevertheless, her ability to build a domestic political consensus is questionable. Her views would alienate some potential coalition partners. She maintains strong and consistent ideological positions on national security issues that may limit the LDP’s attempts to broaden its electoral appeal.
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Agriculture Minister Koizumi, 44, is telegenic and charismatic. He helps counteract the complaint that the LDP is run by out-of-touch old men. Being the son of former Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi boosted his profile at the start of his political career. His popularity has grown since, assisted by his success in reining in rice prices.
Mr Koizumi echoes the mainstream preference for a balanced policy of supporting the US alliance while maintaining a constructive relationship with China. He is not, however, stridently anti-China; indeed, some conservatives accuse him of being soft on China.
Interestingly, Mr Koizumi has said he would try to meet North Korea’s paramount leader Kim Jong Un and improve ties with Pyongyang “without preconditions, without being bound by the approach taken so far” – a reference to the issue of North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens during the years 1977 to 1983.
Pyongyang admitted to a few abductions and said all cases are resolved, while many Japanese believe the North Koreans are covering up a much larger number of other cases. Setting aside this issue, a stumbling block in efforts to improve Japan-North Korea relations, would be extraordinary and controversial.
Mr Koizumi is known to Americans, having studied at Columbia University in New York and worked for a US think-tank. He was Washington’s preferred candidate in the 2024 party leadership contest, according to Mr Jeffrey Hornung, an analyst with the RAND research institute.
Although Mr Koizumi could improve the LDP’s standing with younger voters, he is relatively inexperienced and his leadership is unproven. Critics say he lacks substance, is vague and evasive when it comes to offering fresh policy ideas, and is getting undeserved opportunities due to his famous name.
Party elders may prefer Mr Koizumi because they expect he would be easier to control than the older, more experienced and more opinionated Ms Takaichi. The voting for LDP leader, however, will be open to all one million party members.
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In selecting its new leader, the party can go harder conservative with Ms Takaichi or demonstrate a break with the old past with Mr Koizumi.
But whoever wins will have the unusually difficult task of unifying the faction-riven party and attracting votes from very different parts of the electorate. Many analysts expect the new prime minister will have a short tenure.
Under LDP rule, Japan’s foreign policy has been moving towards aligning more closely with the US, fielding stronger and less legally constrained armed forces, and taking bolder positions in opposition to Chinese expansionism. Other governments in the region value Japan as one of the strong points in a collection of overlapping security cooperation arrangements that include not only the US-Japan alliance, but also the Quad and Japan’s capacity-building assistance to the Philippines.
The weakened position of the LDP, however, could result in a slowdown of some of these trends. Disunity at home, particularly a lack of consensus on achieving the 2 per cent defence spending goal, would undermine Japan’s ability to contribute to a combined pushback against Chinese territorial encroachments in the region. The effectiveness of the Quad is already threatened by the US-India spat.
Most Japanese agree in principle with a defence build-up, but don’t want to pay for it. Moreover, the tax cuts and stimulus payments proposed by Ms Takaichi would reduce the revenue supporting the government budget. Issuing additional bonds would threaten Japan’s medium-term prosperity by increasing the burden of payments on the country’s debt, now the highest in the developed world at 250 per cent of GDP.
The fallout from Yasukuni Shrine visits is a potential problem for both Mr Koizumi (whose father made multiple visits as prime minister) and Ms Takaichi, but Japan’s relations with both China and South Korea would likely deteriorate more under a Takaichi-led government.
Beijing sees her as a trouble-maker. Along with the Yasukuni visits, official Chinese media criticise her for “playing the Taiwan card” and advocating for stronger Japanese armed forces.
South Korean media similarly characterise Ms Takaichi as extreme right wing, a “female Abe”, who would be difficult for Seoul to work with. A deterioration in ties with Seoul would impede progress in trilateral security cooperation, which would displease Washington despite Ms Takaichi’s dependability as a China hawk.
Superficially, Ms Takaichi and Mr Koizumi represent discontinuity because of gender and youth, respectively. Nevertheless, the LDP under new leadership will remain constrained by circumstances.
Despite considerable effort by Tokyo, there is new uncertainty about the US government’s appreciation for the strategic value of allies such as Japan, as well as about Washington’s commitment to continuing to nurture a region-wide security architecture.
Instead of part of a strong team, Japan could end up isolated. Domestic demand for cost-of-living relief threatens the country’s ability to fulfil its plans for military strengthening. Also, the need to appease nationalistic and anti-foreigner sentiment could derail security cooperation with South Korea. Japan is in danger of becoming a less consequential strategic player at a time when the region needs the opposite.
Denny Roy is senior fellow at the East-West Centre, Honolulu.
